![]() ![]() The Florida Department of Transport (FDOT) set out their peer review requirements in their Plans Preparation Manual. These whys go on and on, and in this instalment we’ll answer a key one: why did gross errors in the bridge’s design go unidentified, despite the design being subject to peer review by an independent engineering firm.Ī close examination of why this peer review process failed shows how the systems we put in place to prevent engineering collapses can fall apart just as easily as the bridge itself. Why weren’t FIGG more concerned about the cracks? Why didn’t the Florida Department of Transport (FDOT) stop construction? Why did the parties believe re-tensioning Member 11 would return the bridge to a satisfactory condition? ![]() In fact many engineers involved in the project behaved this way. ![]() (You probably spent most of Part 2 shouting “stop, stop” while you read about the growing cracks.)īut engineers did behave this way. If this were a movie you’d say it was unrealistic, you’d say engineers would never behave so nonchalantly in the face of significant structural cracking. The more details you learn of what happened, the harder it is to understand why it happened. A curious paradox lies at the heart of trying to understand why the Miami bridge collapsed. ![]()
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